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This  paper attempts to  assess  the feasibility of the  current
strategy of manufactured export-led growth for Turkey over the
Fifth  and  Sixth  Five-Year Plan  periods  (1985-1994).  The
explicit  hypothesis of the paper is  that a  domestic  market,
wage-goods  oriented  development  strategy  with  agriculture
leading  the process will be more conducive to Turkey's  long-
term  economic  growth,  as  compared  to  an  export-oriented
strategy.
The  simulation  experiments  are conducted with the  aid  of  a
dynamic  micro-planning  model  which belongs to  a  class  of
price-endogenous  constructs  known  as  Computable  General
Equilibrium  (CGE)  models.  The model as  applied  to  Turkey
distinguishes  seven  economic  sectors,  four types  of  labor,
three consumer  groups, seven social classes, and a government.
In  addition,  it  accommodates both fixed and  flexible  wages
along  with  a disequilibrium mechanism of  labor  allocation,
endogenous  rural-urban migration,  international trade  flows
with government intervention, and separate rules  of allocation
for  the private  -versus-  public fixed investment.
The overall conclusion  that is  supported by this  study is  that
by  combining  a  time-wise  regressive,  selective  export-
promotion program with a domestic demand oriented,  wage-goods
strategy,  Turkey  can  achieve a superior growth  performance
over  the  current  strategy  of  manufactured  export-led
industrialization.
The  model results  further emphasize the pressing need for the
revitalization of the domestic demand,  and the  importance  of
the  agricultural  productivity growth in  promoting  Turkey's
overall objectives of industrialization,  income equity  ,  and
foreign trade over  the Fifth and Sixth Plan periods.STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND TRADE IN TURKEY:  A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
OF THE EXPORT-LED VERSUS DOMESTIC  DEMAND-LED STRATEGIES OF DEVELOPMENT
1) Introduction
After 20 years of planned inward-looking industrialization experience,
with the  introduction of a wide-ranging set of economic policies  on January
24,  1980, Turkey started to pursue an outward-oriented growth path centered
around the dynamism of manufactured exports.  Both the  IMF and the World
Bank provided generous support  to  the Turkish adjustment efforts.  Thus,
over  the 1980-1985  period, Turkey used SDR 1.5 billion from the  IMF, in
addition to  the World Bank's U.S. $1.6  billion of "structural adjustment"
loans  (SALs).
Stimulated mainly by a vigorous export promotion strategy which
consisted of high export subsidies,  competitive devaluation of the Lira and
repressive  attitudes towards  the domestic demand, Turkey succeeded in
increasing the  total value  of its merchandise  exports fourfold within the
1980-1985 period, averaging an  increase of 25%  per annum.  This high export
growth, however, was not  achieved without costs, nor was  free of problems.
Indeed, during the referred period, Turkish economy was  observed to be beset
with a variety of structural  imbalances and inconsistencies, which, in turn,
gave rise  to  serious doubts  about the  limits  to  further export expansion,
and the possibilities  of future growth  in manufacturing industries in
general to  sustain that  expansion.
First,  despite all  the  conscious  attempts and generous  incentives
towards  the private sector to  induce more  "privatization" of the  economy,
private  investments have observed to be stagnant and business conditions
remained sluggish since the January 1980 Reform.  This fact, coupled with
the  overall disability of the political system to  create public sectorresources and investment  in the public sector, resulted in a sharp drop  in
fixed capital  investments and an increase in the  rate of unemployment.
Further, there was  an observed imbalance between the structure of exports
(in favor of manufactured products) and the allocation of private investment
funds  (away from manufacturing industries),  a phenomenon which was  directly
in conflict with the  foundations  of the  overall growth strategy that  rests
on increased manufactured exports.  Thus,  in the post-Reform period, the
decline  in private investment and the increase in unemployment seemed to be
the  two  "concomitants" of the Turkish export promotion efforts.
A third imbalance was yet to  be found in the  sectoral priorities which
were  severely biased against agriculture.  Throughout the period,
agricultural output growth has been slow and erratic, and became  one of the
main causes  of the prolonged domestic  inflation through the  increases  in
food prices.
Finally, the export promotion strategy was also observed to be coupled
with a militant policy of repressing wage incomes, which led itself to  an
overall suppression of the domestic demand in  the economy.  Under conditions
of slow growth, the  repression of the domestic demand this way has been
quite  instrumental  in generating a surplus which could be allocated to
foreign markets via exports.  However, contrasted with the historical
importance of the  domestic absorption capacity of the Turkish economy,
export expansion by itself could not have produced sufficient invigoration
for economic growth, and the manufacturing industries continued to operate
at  sub-capacity levels  throughout the post-Reform period.
Thus,  Turkey came  to a cross-roads  in 1985--the year at which the Fifth
Five-Year Development Plan would be put  into effect:  in the  coming decade,
should Turkey continue with its  dedication  to manufactured export-led growthdevoting its  resources  for foreign markets;  or should it re-evaluate  its
current repressive  stance towards  the domestic market, and make attempts  to
re-orient  its industry  towards establishing stronger linkages with the  rest
of the  domestic economy?
The analytical quest for  the  answer to  this  question constitutes  the
main motivation of this  study.  More specifically, the paper calls  for an
assessment  of the feasibility of manufactured export-led growth as  the
major dynamic of development for  the Turkish economy in the  coming decade,
which effectively covers  the Fifth and the Sixth Five-Year Plan periods;  and
attempts to  design an economically viable alternative development  strategy.
In this  context, given the economic problems  of the past decade, and
given the realities of the  domestic and the  international environment,  it
has  to be recognized that a reversal to  the previous  inward-looking strategy
of import-substitutionist  industrialization  is  no longer feasible, nor
desirable.  Yet,  it  should be  realized that  the export-led development model
alone does not exhaust the wide spectrum of  "open" development strategies.
Indeed,  in her own search for  the alternative styles of development  that are
"beyond export-led growth", Adelman  (1984, p:  938)  emphasizes the
distinction between "an open development strategy, in which trade  is  an
element of growth, and an export-led strategy in which trade  is  the major
source of growth".
Thus,  this  study starts with the major premise  that  the  export-led
model  is not  the only potentially promising alternative to  the closed-
economy strategies of development.  To be more  explicit, it  is  argued in the
following pages of this paper  that, within the  confines of an open trade
regime, a reallocation of investment funds towards  the agricultural  sectors
which serve  the domestic market rather than the foreign markets may lead tosuperior outcomes  over those of the export-led industrialization strategy.
The arguments  in favor of such a strategy would rest on the  dynamic
backward-forward linkages between the  induced growth of  the agriculture and
the  created mass market for the domestic  industrial products  that will be
used as  inputs  in  this process.  Hence, effectively proposed is  a "balanced"
industrialization strategy, working through the  agriculture-industry
interlinkages by expanding the  internal demand for the intermediate  and
final  (consumption) goods  that are produced by the domestic manufacturing
sectors.
The  intuition behind this hypothesis  is  the  argument that by increasing
the rate of  investment and production in the wage-goods and  in the key
linkage-manufactures  (intermediates, capital goods,  etc.)  simultaneously;
and further, by generating an effective demand for  the  domestic absorption
of these  goods, the  conditions of a more balanced growth path can be  created
that is  in harmony with its production targets and the patterns of
consumption.
The logic and rationale of the proposed emphasis on the  "agriculture-
linked-manufacturing growth" reflects,  in part, an optimism that
agricultural and industrial growth can be restructured to find its  dynamic
by serving  the domestic market in an open trade regime, rather than being
bounded by the often conjectural and uncertain conditions of foreign demand.
That growth of agriculture can be expected to  stimulate industrial
growth through a variety of mechanisms  is  well recognized and argued for in
the  development literature.  These mechanisms  include:  1) the  release of an
agricultural labor  surplus to become a source  of industrial employment
(Lewis, 1954;  Ranis & Fei,  1961;  Jorgenson, 1961);  2) the provision of
cheaper food production and raw materials,  and hence lower wage costs  andintermediate  good prices for  the  inputs used by the  industry  (Mellor, 1976);
3) the  generation of resource pulls  through intermediate and final  demand
linkages  for the products  produced by the  industry  (Adelman, 1984;
Hirschman, 1981;  Hayami & Ruttan, 1985);  and 4) the provision of an
investable surplus  through the  transfer of agricultural savings  and rents
(Adams, 1978;  Mellor, 1984;  Chichilnisky & Taylor, 1980).
The proposed strategy is  well suited to a middle-income  developing
country like Turkey, with her established agricultural base  and the mass
domestic market.  Studies by Celasun  (1983) and by Nishimuzu & Robinson
(1984),  for instance, conclude  that domestic demand expansion has been the
most important source of growth for Turkey in the post-war era.  The  call
for  such a strategy  is  especially timely for Turkey, which,  in the  early
1970's,  had successfully completed  the initial  stages  of industrialization
that  consisted of the  domestic production of consumer nondurables  and light
intermediates  (World Bank, 1982;  Pamuk, 1984).  Hence, the  challenge for
Turkey in the next decade  is  the  establishment of the capital  goods and the
basic intermediate  industries, and domestic production of the  associated
technologies.  The advocated strategy, with its  emphasis on the  dynamic
backward and forward interlinkages across  sectors  seems  to be  the most
appropriate strategy  serving Turkey's  long-term industrialization interests.
It  is  thus hypothesized in  this paper  that a domestic market oriented
development model with agriculture leading  the process will be more
conducive to  Turkey's  long term economic growth as  compared to  an export-
oriented development strategy.
To test this hypothesis  analytically, the  paper employs  a dynamic
micro-planning model which belongs  to a class  of price-endogenous constructs
known as  Computable General Equilibrium  (CGE) models.  The model  is  composedof a simultaneous  system of non-linear equations which endogenously solve
for:  relative prices,  sectoral production, wages, profits, the  exchange
rate,  imports,  exports,  sectoral consumption and investment, and the
functional distribution of income.
The model as  applied to Turkey distinguishes  seven economic  sectors,
four types of labor,  three consumer groups, seven social classes and a
government.  In addition, it accommodates both fixed and flexible wages
along with a disequilibrium mechanism of labor allocation, endogenous  rural-
urban migration, international trade  flows with government  intervention, and
separate rules of allocation for  the private-versus-public fixed investment.
The rest of the paper is  organized as  follows:  the next section
presents an overview of the  Turkish economy  in the post-1980 period, and
analyzes  in depth the economic  implications of the policy measures
implemented with the  1980 Reform package.  The third section describes the
model and its distinguishing characteristics.  The simulation results are
presented in the  fourth section.  The paper concludes with a general
discussion in section five, and with a mathematical  summary of the model
equation as an Appendix.
2) Elements of Transition:  The 1980 Reform and the Manufactured
Export-led Growth
The January 1980 Reform package aimed at not only short run
stabilization, but  also at  changing the  structure of the economy towards
more outward orientation by providing an increased role  to the private
sector  and the market forces.  Further, a change  in sectoral priorities have
occurred, with greater emphasis being given to  the export-oriented
manufactures, such as  processed food items,  textiles and wearing apparel  and
light  intermediates, and also  to commercial services,  especially overseascontracting.
These principles  were simulteously translated into a set of far-
reaching policies:  Turkish Lira was  devalued by almost 50%  against the US
Dollar, with further daily adjustments made  to  ensure  that  the effects  of
price  increases  on the real  exchange rate be offset.  The existing multiple
exchange rate  system (of five  different rates) was  eliminated -- except for
imports  of fertilizer and other agricultural  chemicals.  Commensurate with
the real  devaluation policy, an extensive scheme  of export encouragement
measures were  introduced.  Exporters were given the right to  import
intermediate inputs and other capital goods  duty-free under the  foreign
exchange  allocation scheme.  A subsidized credit system was established
which provided exporters  easy access  to Central Bank credits  at a rate lower
than the  one charged on similar projects whose output  is  not directed for
exports.  Further, in January 1981, new income  tax reductions were granted
for  exporters;  and in May 1981, tax rebate  rates  (which were designed to
reimburse  the exporters  for the  indirect taxes  they paid for  the production
of the  exportables) were  increased substantially.
The  import regime was  liberalized and the waiting period for  import
licenses was reduced considerably.  The quota list was eliminated and
imports were grouped into  two:  Liberalized List  I  --  goods whose
importation would be  free;  and Liberalized List II  --  goods with partial
import limitations.  This was  followed by the  restructuring of the tariff
system in December, 1983,  and a further  import liberalization in which, in
value  terms,  about 80%  of the  items  in Liberalized List  II were freed from
quantitative restrictions.  This meant an important turning point in
Turkey's  efforts  of trade liberalization, effectively increasing the  share
of free imports  in  total imports  from  18%  to  60%  by the end of 1983.2Measures were also taken to introduce more  flexibility and rationality
to  the  state enterprise system.  In particular, the State Economic
Enterprises'  (SEEs')  prices were liberalized and consumer subsidies  were
eliminated or greatly reduced.  This policy has had considerable  immediate
effects, leading  to price increases  ranging from 45%  for gasoline,  to 300%
for paper products and to  400%  for fertilizer.
In July of 1980,  interest rates were  freed from government  ceilings.
This policy was met with sharp  increase in interest rates  on both deposits
and loans.  However, with the enforcement of a "gentlemen's  agreement" by a
cartel of commercial banks, it did not render much competition within the
commercial banking system.  Finally, a value added tax  (VAT) scheme was
enacted in November 1984, which replaced all production and other indirect
taxes.
Overall however, despite the  extensiveness of the  1980 Reform measures,
their  economic effects have been retarded mostly due to  the unsettled
political climate.  Real GDP continued to decline  in 1980 and reached an
annual average  of  -1.1% for  that year.  It was only after the  September 1980
military  intervention that political certainty has been established and
social conditions became  "mature" enough to allow the  full implementation of
the  reform package.  Thus,  1981 constituted the  turning point for  the
domestic economy.  In that year, led by a 62%  rise  in the  dollar value of
merchandise exports, GNP grew by 4.1%,  and industrial value added rose by
7.2%.  With a 13%  growth registered for  the merchandise imports,  current
account deficit was narrowed to  $2,342 million after  its record high of
$3,680 million in 1980.  Further,  the premium on the Dollar  in the
(unofficial) parallel foreign exchange market declined to  2.3%  from its peak
of 50%  in 1979. 3However, due to  the restrictive monetary policies and the reduction in
domestic absorption, business  conditions have  in general been sluggish, and
domestic private investment remained stagnant  in 1981,  after its decline of
20%  in 1980.  Thus,  despite the wage reductions which allowed for an average
4 nominal  increase of only 12-15%  (after taxes)  in 1981  ,  unemployment
increased from 14.8%  in  1980, to  15.2%  in  1981, and further  to  15.6%  in
1982.
Table 1 presents  the main economic indicators  of this period.  It  can
be  seen that, led by the export demand, growth in manufacturing has been
quite high, but this performance was not shared by other sectors of the
economy.  Growth in  agriculture has been sluggish and erratic, and the
construction sector was virtually stagnant throughout the decade.  As  a
consequence, real GDP growth has been modest, averaging 4.4%  per annum.
Accordingly, the  growth in the  domestic uses of the  GDP, through fixed
investment and consumption, were hesitant, averaging 3% per annum for  the
former, and 3.1%  for  the latter.  This observation suggests that during the
analyzed period the  sources  of growth came not from the domestic  economy.
but from outside via increased export  demand.
Indeed, the export performance of  the Turkish economy between 1980 and
1985 was  quite remarkable.  The value of exports expanded from $2.9 billion
in 1980,  to  $7.9 billion in 1985,  registering an average  rate of growth of
22%  per annum.  Coupled with this  overall expansion, both the  sectoral
composition and the  country destination of exports have undergone major
changes.  The  share of industrial exports were doubled from 36%  of  the total
in 1980,  to  80%  in 1985.  The average rate  of growth of such exports was  on
the order of 50%  per annum and continuous throughout the period.  In the
meantime, however, agricultural  exports registered negative growth rates,TABLE  1:  Main Economic Indicators:  Turkey, 1979-1985
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
Real  Growth  in:
Agri  culture  2.8  1.7  0.1  6.4  -0.1  3.5  2.4
Mining  -16.3  -4.1  -7.3  -5.5  7.5  7.9  11.9
Manufacture  -5.3  -6.4  9.5  5.4  8.7  10.2  5.5
Construction  4.2  0.8  0.4  0.5  0.6  1.9  2.9
Services  0.2  -0.2  3.7  3.5  3.9  5.3  4.0
GDP(FC)  -0.6  -1.0  3.6  4.5  3.9  5.8  4.2
Fi  xed
Investment  -3.6  -10.0  1.7  3.4  3.0  2.0  5.1
Private
Consumption -3.1  -5.2  0.6  1.5  4.9  5.3  3.4
Volume in  Mill  US $:
Exports  2261  2910  4703  5746  5728  7133  7958
Imports  5069  7909  8933  8843  9235  10757  11344
Current  Acc.
Deficit  1639  3408  1919  935  1848  1407  813
Wholesale
Prices'  63.8  10  7.2  36.8  25.2  30).6  52.0  44.0
Index  of  real  wages:'
SII  100  74.7  69.1  69.3  70.0  66.6  65.9
MI  100  92.9  109.9  94.3  87.8  75.0  62.5
Unemployment
Rate  13.6  14.8  15.2  15.6  16.1  16.1  16.7
1) Percentage change over  previous year.
2)  Based  on Consumer  Price  Index.  The SII  data are the average
daily wages  as reported by the Social  Insurance  Institute.  The MI
(Manufacturing Industry) Survey wage  is calculated by dividing
total  payments by the number of  workers engaged.
Sources:  SPO  Annual  Programs;  World Bank  --EM2DA Turkey Data
Information System,  1986.and their share was reduced to  16%  of the  total in  1985.5
In terms  of country destination of exports,  there was  also a drastic
change  in favor of the Middle Eastern countries, especially to  Iran and
Iraq.  Exports  to the Middle Eastern market have  increased by an average
rate  of 40%  per annum, and their  share  in total exports have quadrupled from
10.3%  in 1979,  to  reach 40.7%  in 1985.  It  can in general be argued that
special  events,  such  as  the war  conjuncture  in  the region, have played a
crucial role  enabling Turkey to  expand its  exports towards  that market.
Indeed,  thanks  to  its neutrality policy, Turkey managed to continue  its
economic  relations with both Iran and Iraq, and  the share of  exports
destined to  those two  countries have jumped from a mere 7.5%  of  the total  in
1980,  to  24.4%  in 1982,  and stabilized around 26%  for  the  rest of the
period.  In fact, of the  $1.8 billion increase in the value of exports in
1981, as much as  $0.8  billion was  accounted by the  imports  of these two
countries, with an additional $0.4 billion claimed by Libya and S. Arabia.
Based on these observations  some scholars argued that the  limitedness  of the
Turkish exports markets  and their conjectural nature  in general,  signal a
deficiency in the overall export strategy, and might hinder possibilities of
future export growth once  the special conditions of the war conjuncture are
over  (Berksoy, 1985; Kepenek, 1984).  Nevertheless, it  is  still a
unanimously held view in Turkey that without the high devaluation policy and
the export promotion scheme, such markets could not have been exploited, and
that, the  surge  in exports can not be explained by the  favorable
international conjuncture alone.
Subsidies to  exports were  indeed substantial throughout  the period,
ranging between 23%  (in 1983)  and 15%  (in 1984) of the value of exports
within the manufacturing sector  (Milanovic, 1986).  The most important
11component of the  subsidy was  the production tax  rebates which covered about
half of the  subsidies granted in 1982 and 1983, and amounted to as much as
75%  of the  total subsidy  rate  in 1984 during when the  rebate rates were
finally being scaled down.
Since the Reform, the relatively high levels  of the  tax rebates became
a very controversial issue and came under  severe criticisms.  In addition to
8
being a source  of high losses  to the  central government budget  ,  the rebate
scheme was held responsible for the emergence of the  so-called "fictitious"
exports, which, in effect, can be  defined as  that amount of foreign exchange
transferred from the country of destination of exports  to  the Turkish
Central Bank, while the  actual  transfer of goods have never taken place.
The  transfer of foreign currency, however, entitled the exporter to claim
the  tax rebates.  Thus,  one part of what purported to be  "merchandise
exports" was  actually never realized.  Milanovic  (1986, p. 12)  reports, for
instance,  that the value of "fictitious" exports was estimated at about $1
billion in 1984,  or 14% of total exports  at that year!
In addition to  the direct subsidy scheme, another set of policies  that
have been quite instrumental  in bringing forth the  overall expansion in
exports was to be  found in the  sphere of the domestic economy.  As was noted
earlier, the  rate of growth of domestic demand in the analyzed period stayed
on the order of 3% per annum, while the average annual rate of grwoth of GDP
has been about 4.5%.  Especially effective  in curtailing the  growth in the
domestic demand was the  repressive real wage policies of the period, which
successively suppressed the wage demands of the workers.  So  that  the real
wage index, with 1979 taken as  the base-year, fell to  65.9  in 1985 for the
insured workers, or to  62.5  if the overall manufacturing wages were  to be
considered.
12In general,  it can be  argued that  in an economy in which export
expansion is  considered to  be of prime  importance,  the militant policy of
suppressing real wages would serve a dual purpose:  First, by reducing the
effective domestic demand it would render the  foreign markets  to become
relatively more profitable and attractive vis-a-vis the  domestic markets.
Second by holding labor costs down, it would allow the exportables  to be
more competitive  in foreign markets  and also would stimulate further
investments.
Looking in retrospect,  it can be said that  the fall  in real wages  in
Turkey has  in fact been conducive  in  limiting the size  of the domestic
market, and  thereby provided sufficient surplus,-which, with the  stimulation
of the generous  incentives, has  found  its vent  in expanded exports.
The  second aspect of the  repressive wages policy, on the other hand,
was not observed to be materialized within the  time span considered here.
Private investments,  despite all  the  incentives aiming at the privatization
of the  economy, have been sluggish  and stagnated at about 7.5%  of  the GNP.
As  the public  investments were gradually receded to the  order of 11.0%  of
the GNP in  1985, however, aggregate  fixed capital  investment began to  lose
its  share  in total GNP and have declined to  18.6 percent in 1985  (see Table
2).
This  development has  indeed given rise to  a rather interesting
phenomenon regarding the  distribution of investments between the public and
private  sectors.  We have noted above  that with the  introduction of the  1980
Reform,  the reduction of the  size of the public sector became one  of the main
targets  of the policy makers.  It was hoped that with proper  incentives,
private  investment would fill  in the programmed reductions of the public
sector.  The experience of the  1980-1985 period, however, suggests
13Table  2:  Relative Shares  of the  Public & Private Sectors  in Total
Fixed Capital Investments
(Current Billion TL & Percent)










































































%.f  16  & A-  A-  A.  46otherwise.  As  documented in Table 2, the share  of the private sector  in
total fixed capital  investments were observed to  drop  to the  order of 39.4%
after 1981,  from their historical trend of 50%  of the  1970's.  Contrasted
with  the  fact that  the  industrialization strategy of the  1970's was  one of
public-induced growth,  the observed drop  in the share  of the private
investments after 1980,  in an era of dedication  to  the privatization of
incentives,  looks rather peculiar, and raises  serious doubts about the power
and intentions of the private capital-holders  to mobilize  their resources
without complementary attempts  from  the public sector.
Equally important in this  context  is  the private  sector's priorities in
allocating  its investment funds  among the productive  sectors of the  economy.
To  gain more  insights on  this matter, an appropriate approach would be to
look at how the  "investment incentive  certificates"  are distributed over the
productive sectors within the  analyzed period.  The distribution of the
investment  incentive certificates  represent,  in general,  the private
enterpreneurs' intentions  to  invest and their preferences across various
sectors.  Table 3 indicates  that since  the Reform, the  share of the
investment certificates allocated to  agriculture and manufacturing has
declined substantially, and that of transportation, export, and to  some
extent, mining has  increased.  Further, within the manufacturing sector,
incentives were  reallocated towards  the  "light consumer  items",  as  the  share
of the  food and textiles increased their claim of the certificates within
the manufacturing sector from 22.3%  (of the manufacturing total)  in 1980,  to
54%  in 1985.
Commensurate with the observed loss of interest towards  the
manufacturing industries  (observe in particular, the  dramatic decline  in  the
total value of certificates  claimed during 1982 and 1983),  investment goods
15imports have virtually stagnated since 1982.  Investment goods  imports were
valued at  $2,324 million in  1982,  and at  $2,317 million in  1983.  They
increased by 14%  in 1984  to  $2.659 million, but were again reduced to  $2,500
9
million in 1985,  well below its  programmed target of $2,900 million  . This
phenomenon came  rise despite  the overall  increases of imports  (at an average
rate  of 7.4% per annum) and the generous  tariff incentives granting duty-
free  importation of such goods  for exports producers, and could mostly be
explained by the  observed tendency of "dis-investment"  in the manufacturing
industry.
TABLE  3:  Sectoral  Distribution of Investment Incentive
Certificates,  1980-1985 (%)
1
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985
Agriculture  13.3  4.4  4.7  3.8  2.0  1.9
Mining  1.8  2.8  2.7  5.4  19.4  11.0
Manufacture  78.1  48.1  41.0  47.7  50.5  40.8
(of which
Food,Textiles)  (22.3)  (26.4)  (28.2)  (32.6)  (53.8)  (54.0)
Energy  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.5  2.3  0.2
Transportation  5.1  42.1  41.9  28.2  10.7  39.4
Tourism  1.4  0.3  1.7  4.4  7.7  3.4
Trade  0.1  0.1  1.3  1.7  0.8  1.3
Other Services  0.0  1.0  3.9  3.6  2.1  1.9
Export  ---  1.1  2.6  4.9  4.5
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Bill TL:  207.0  1046.0  513.3  571.2  1105.2  745.1
1)  Provisional Figures  for January-May.
Sources:  SPO Annual Programs;  TUSAID, 1985,  p:  124.
16From a dynamic growth-oriented perspective, however,  this observation
signals a very important deficiency in the  industrialization strategy:  that
precisely at the  same time  the overall  growth strategy rests  on increased
manufactured exports, physical investments shy away from manufacturing
industries, putting  their future growth potentials under serious  dubiety.
In this  context, the TUSAID 1985 Report argues  that one  of the main
reasons  for  the  stagnation in private  investments have been the  restricted
domestic demand and the concomitant low use of the  installed production
capacity in the manufacturing sector.  Indeed, by 1985, use of the
installed production capacity in private manufacturing still could not have
exceeded the  70%  mark.  In turn, according  to the  respondents to  the  SIS  -
Manufacturing Industry Surveys, the most important reason for
underutilization of capacity has again been the insufficiency of domestic
demand, with its importance gradually rising over time  from an average  index
of 45%  in 1983,  to  52%  in 1985.10
Summarizing then,  the analysis of this  section clearly indicates that
there  exists a pressing need for  the revitalization of the domestic  demand,
and of the domestic  absorption capacity in  general, for the Turkish economy
within the next decade.  Growth in the post-Reform period, while being
moderately rapid, was mainly based on the  increased foreign demand for  the
manufactured output, and in  this sense, we chose  to  label the  economic
strategy of the period as  that of  "manufactured export-led
industrialization."
It was  argued that  the  two main instruments of  this strategy were:  1)
generation of an exportable surplus by way of curtailing the domestic  demand
(absorption) via suppressed real wages;  and 2)  allocation of this surplus
to  foreign markets through an extensive scheme  of export  subsidies and a high
17devaluation policy.
Viewed in this context,  then, the  limits  to  further export expansion
and further economic growth in Turkey would be  drawn:  firstly, by the
possibilities  of future growth in the manufacturing industries,  so  that the
exportable surplus could be  sustained;  and secondly, by the  extent to which
dometic demand could further be suppressed.
Looking in retrospect, one  can argue that with an incentives  strategy
that biases  investments away from the productive  sectors and leads to
stagnation in the capital investment goods industries, such limits would be
reached very soon.
This argument finally brings forward  the task of seeking  out the viable
alternatives to  the current strategy of growth in Turkey, and it  is
precisely this  task  to  which  the  rest  of  this  paper  is  to  be  devoted.
3)  The Model
A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model  is  a multisector, multi-
agent construct which  is  composed of a set  of non-linear simultaneous
equations which simulate  the optimizing behavior of various economic  actors
in response  to various market signals.
All  CGE models are Walrasian in spirit,  in  that they are constructed
along the  lines of production--income distribution--consumption--capital
accumulation and certain rules  for market clearing in factor and product
markets.
The model utilized in this  study belongs  to  the  class of CGE models
that incorporate  the  international economy as well  as  the domestic market
into analysis.  As  a tribute  to  its dynamic characteristics  it is  named
TURKPLAN.  Its  theoretical foundations  stem from the now classic book by
18Dervis,  de Melo and Robinson  (1982),  and borrow elements from the  earlier
CGE applications  to Turkey --  by Dervis & Robinson (1978),  Lewis & Urata
(1983)  and by Grais,  de Melo & Urata  (1984).
The model  is  constructed and designed to  be run  in two  stages.  The
first  stage  is  a static  general equilibrium construction which is  composed
of a system of non-linear simultaneous  equations which converges  to a within
period solution by means of a numerical solution algorithm in both
production and factor markets.  The second stage, on the  other  is  designed
to up-date the  exogenous variables of the  first stage.  It  is  a dynamic
system and basically used for  the purposes of  "aging" the model.
In the static stage, given an arbitrary set of prices,  the model  solves
for  the output levels across  sectors and finds  the market clearing wage
rates  and profits.  These,  in turn, become sources  of income  generation for
various household groups and determine the patterns  of demand.  Quantities
imported and exported are  solved as  a function of domestic production costs,
international prices and relevant elasticities.  The  investment behavior  is
also endogenized through the saving propensities  and sectoral investment
share parameters which, in turn, are  determined as  a function of the
differential profit rates  across sectors.  After calculating excess  demands
in  this manner, the model updates  the  initial  guess  of domestic prices
through a Walrasian tatonnement algorithm and iterates  the whole process
until convergence  is  achieved.
In the second stage, a dynamic adjustment process  is  provided which
allows for capital  accumulation;  for population growth;  for changes  in
technical productivity;  and for other changes in  the  "behavior" of economic
actors.  Other key variables such as world prices,  domestic price index,
exogenous cash flows and the  exchange rate  (if  it were held fixed in  the
19first stage) are  also updated in this  stage.  Also  it  is  in this  dynamic
stage  that the model recognizes rural-urban migration possibilities and
utilizes  a Harris & Todaro  (1970) type of an adjustment process  in which
migratory behavior is  seen as a function of the differences between the
rural and the  expected urban wage rates.
The overall model utilizes elements of the neo-classical general
equilibrium theory with optimizing behavior on the part of consumers and
producers in response  to market signals under competitive  conditions.  The
main stream neo-classical paradigm provides almost the  only formal
analytical apparatus  available to  assign numerical values  to the  decision of
various economic  agents.  In many real world applications  to  the  developing
countries, however, modellers have adapted a variety of  structuralist
phenomena to better reflect  the workings of such economies.  The  term
"structuralist" is  often associated with the Latin American school of
thought with regards  to the  inflationary macro-imbalances of a developing
economy, though in our context,  it should more generally be associated with
a recognition of imperfect markets and low elasticities  in production and
trade.
To be more explicit, on the production side,  the neo-classical
assumptions  of perfect mobility of physical capital and the thereby
equalization of profit rates  across sectors are dropped.  Sectoral physical
capital  stocks are held fixed in  the static  stage and the profit rates are
allowed to vary.  In the dynamic  stage, however, a behavioral rule is
provided, which updates  the sectoral  investment allocation coefficients  in
response to  differences  in the  sectoral profit rates.  This behavioral
submodel,  in a way "lurches"  the system towards  a dynamic  intertemporal
(neoclassical) equilibrium, in which, profit rates  across sectors  are
20equalized.
Domestic output in each sector is  given by a constant return Cobb-
Douglas production function with capital and aggregate  labor as primary
inputs.  Intermediate  inputs  are assumed to be  demanded in fixed proportions
to  the level  of output.  Labor  is  further disaggregated into four
categories:  Agricultural  labor is  employed only  in agriculture,  and is
treated as  separate  and immobile within any period.  However, between
periods, endogenous  rural-urban migration takes place  in  response to  the
differences between the agricultural and the expected urban wage rates.
Within the urban sectors a distinction has been made between the
organized/skilled labor and the unorganized/unskilled labor markets.  The
real wage rate of the organized labor category is  assumed fixed, being only
parametrically varied.  The unorganized labor wage  rate, on the  other hand,
adjusts freely to clear the unorganized labor market, which in turn is
linked with the market for  the skilled  labor through a spill-over mechanism
in which the  excess of the  skilled labor  is  absorbed.  Under such a
specification, there  is no  open unemployment problem  in the model.  The
problem of the  labor surplus  is  thought to be  reflected in the significantly
low wages realized in the unskilled labor market and the consequent urban-
worker poverty.  Figure  1, below, further  illustrates these mechanisms.
Finally, the  service  labor is  employed only in the  "Commercial & Financial
Services"  sector  and typifies the small  scale service enterprise  employees,
family workers, self-employed, etc.
On the trade  side,  the neoclassical hypotheses  of perfect
substitutability of tradables  and the  law of one price are dropped.
Instead, following the  common tradition of the previous CGE models TURKPLAN
























4-iand imports  are imperfect substitutes and are  aggregated in a CES  function
with a given elasticity of substitution.  On the  export side,  domestic
output  is  exhausted between exports and domestic  consumption according to a
Constant Elasticity of Tranformation (CET) specification.  The CET frontier
has been introduced to the  literature by Powell  and Gruen (1968),  and is
used here  in order  to capture  the differences  in the quality and/or the
nature of the  exported goods versus goods used for  domestic consumption,
that are aggregated within the  same sector.
In the  simulation experiments  the exchange rate was held fixed, and an
endogenous deficit on the balance of payments accounts was  allowed to
accumulate.
The macro closure adopted for  the model is  partially "savings-driven",
and borrows  elements from both the neoclassical and the  Cambridgean
specifications.  More specifically, a distinction has been made between the
private and the public consumption-saving decisions.  Private households are
assumed to  save a fraction of their  disposable income, given corresponding
saving parameters.  The government, on the  other hand, is  assumed to  set an
exogenous policy on the  required level of public  investment as a proportion
of total GDP;  and given this exogenous  policy ratio,  it withdraws the
necessary fraction of its  total  income  as public savings, with government
consumption being determined residually.
Thus,  modelled in  this way, the savings-pool  of the economy sets  the
limits  of  investment demand, and capital formation in general.  The choice
of this  specification was based on the  fact  that it would give  the maximum
medium term sensitivity to balance of payments accounts and  the foreign
trade performance  of the economy, the prime focus  of this  study.  It  also
makes investment growth and capital accumulation maximally  sensitive to  the
23levels  of per  capita income and changes  in income distribution.
The base-year for  the model is  1981.  The choice  is  due to the
assumption that the  convulsions  of the second oil-shock have been settled
and the Turkish economy has finally moved out of the  deep recession it
drifted into during the  latter half of the  1970's.  Thus,  1981 can be  taken
to be the year  in which the economy is  in a position of relative
equilibrium.  It  is  also  the year when the  export-drive has begun and new
policies  started to take  shape so  as  to open up  the economy to  foreign
competition.  Therefore the period 1981-onwards offers  a unique era for
Turkey, attracting the  attention of many economists and policy-makers, as
well as  the  author of this paper.
In working with the base-year data set, the process  of model
calibration was  facilitated to  a large extent through  the use of the
software program "General Algebraic Modeling System"  (GAMS) of the World
Bank.  Starting from the  SAM accounts, GAMS simplifies and automates  the
process  of generating the values of the structural parameters needed by the
model, so  that  the data that emerge  from this process represent an
equilibrium solution for  the base year.  The methodology of model
calibration and the associated GAMS  input program are described in further
detail  in Yeldan & Roe  (1987).
The model was  further "validated" through  1981-1985 by checking its
tracking capability of the realized historical growth path as  the  decisive
criterion.
4)  Searching for the Alternatives
This section turns to  an investigation of the medium-term prospects of
the Turkish economy over the  1986-1994 period, which spans  Turkey's Fifth
and Sixth Five-Year Development Plans.  The  CGE model  is  utilized as
24a planning device  in order  to analyze the  expected behavior  of the economy
under the guidance  of alternative development strategies.
In analyzing the  results of the policy experiments,  it  is  important to
keep  in mind that all model outcomes are  conditional upon the successful
implementation of specific policy packages and the projections  of various
exogenous variables.  It  should be made clear that  the model does not
attempt to  "predict the future",  nor does  it have  a claim to  do  so.  Rather,
it  is  designed to be used as a laboratory  to test  the relative, in contrast
to absolute, effects of various development strategies, given the projected
path of exogenous variables and the  domestic and external economic
conditions.  The primary objective is  to assess  the  relative characteristics
of the projected growth paths generated by different policy regimes,  and to
be  able  to  identify various objectives with the associated policy variables.
In this context, it has  to be  remembered that choosing one policy option as
being "better" than others  is  always conditional upon our assumptions about
the  "future",  the mathematical specification of  the model,  as well as  the
power and willingness of the government to pursue the policy options
underlined in each policy package.
For various exogenous variables for  the  subperiod 1986-1989, the  data
has been gathered directly from the Fifth Five-Year Plan's  (FFYP's) own
projections.  For the  rest of the experimental period, FFYP's  trend values
have been used.
As we have seen in the second section, during the  1980-1985 period,
Turkish policy-makers have tried to lay the  foundations of a development
strategy which finds  its  dynamic  in increased manufactured exports  and in
the overall reallocation of domestic resources away from agriculture and
towards  industry.  Currently,  the government, with its  centralized
25administration of the  export-incentives, stands strongly for  the
continuation of the  export drive, and regards  this process  as  a means of
"deepening" the  industrial structure of the domestic  economy.  The Fifth
Five-Year Development Plan, which  in fact was drafted in 1983  and put  into
effect in 1985,  is  clearly the government's  most important instrument in
attaining  its  trade objectives for  the next decade.  Our first policy
experiment, then, is  inspired by the  government's current policy stand, and
it mainly simulates a growth path of the economy in which direct export
subsidies to manufacturing and the  reallocation of public investment away
from agriculture to  industry are  the  two main characteristics.  This  first
experiment  is named MXLI,  which stands for  "Manufacturing Export-Led
Industrialization" and is  described  in detail  further below.
As  an alternative to MXLI,  the  simulation of a domestic  demand and wage
goods oriented development  strategy constitutes  the second policy experiment
that  is  to be tested in TURKPLAN for  the coming two Five-Year Plan periods.
As  a tribute to  its  emphasis on the  "linkages"  of the economy, it  is named
"Agriculture-Linked Manufacturing Industrialization"  strategy, and hereafter
referred to with its acronym, ALMI,  to  conserve on space.  I now turn to  a
detailed description of the  two experiments.
The MXLI  strategy  is  simulated by subsidizing manufacturing exports by
12%  (the average subsidy rate  for manufacturing in  1985)  through the
remaining four years of the  Fifth Plan  (1986-1989),  and by 6% during the
Sixth Plan period, with no subsidy being granted to  agricultural exports.
All  subsidy rates  are provided on an ad valorem basis and directly paid out
of the government's budget.  Also, to  eliminate the  tariff induced bias
against exports,  the tariff rates  are decreased gradually from their 1985
levels,  and are abolished completely  in 1990.
26To  further reflect  the positive bias  towards export-oriented
manufacturers, the public  investment shares  of these sectors are  increased at
the expense of agriculture.  More specifically, agriculture's  share of the
public investment fund is  set at  8%,  whereas  the manufacturing sectors  are
allocated a sum of 43%.
Finally, in order  to account  for  the repressive policies  towards labor,
frequently associated with the  orthodox export-oriented policy packages,  the
rate  of growth of the organized labor wages  is  assumed to be only half of
the  rate observed under  the alternative ALMI strategy.
As an alternative  to MXLI,  the ALMI  strategy is  implemented by shifting
the  investment structure towards Agriculture  and those sectors which have
strong backward and forward  linkages with Agriculture, namely Intermediates
and Machinery.  Thus, Agriculture's  share of the  government investment fund
is  gradually increased to  25%  of the  total, by the end of the Fifth Plan
period.  Private investment behavior, on the  other hand, is  allowed to be
determined endogenously, responding to  sectoral deviations from the economy-
wide average  rate of return to capital,  as  is  also  the case under the MXLI
experiment.  Retention of this neoclassical property allows  the model  to
move  towards an intertemporal,  steady-state equilibrium  in which all profit
rates are equilized across  sectors.  As  the ALMI experiment results  indicate
however, notwithstanding the  increased public  investment,  the rate of return
to  agricultural capital remains high so  that agriculture continues  to  claim
a significant portion of  the private  savings as  fixed capital investment.
It  is  assumed that  the  increase in agricultural  investment will allow the
factor productivity of agriculture to grow at a rate twice  faster than the
one  assumed to be  achieved under the MXLI  strategy  (2.5%  versus 1.2%  during
1986-89,  and 2% versus  1% during 1990-94).  Given the prolonged neglect of
27the Turkish agriculture which especially has reached to  severe proportions
during the  1980's,  and given its vast potential of unexploited resources,
the  assumed ALMI  rates of agricultural  technical productivity growth should
be considered modest.  In fact,  the above  assumed ALMI  technological
progress  rates are  20%  below the rates hypothesized by Adelman (1984, p.
941) in her simulations  of the  "Agricultural Demand-led Industrialization"
strategy for Korea, where she has  taken the average productivity growth rate
of all developing countries during the  1970's  as her estimate  of the
technical progress  rate achievable under ADLI during the next decade.
With respect  to  foreign trade, direct export subsidies  are equalized
and tied to a time-table which gradually reduces and abolishes all export
subsidies by 1989,  the last year of the FFYP.  Further, all tariff rates  are
reduced to  10%  and equalized across  all sectors, so  as  to  remove the  anti-
agriculture bias associated with having a differential system of  incentives
that grant higher levels  of protection to  industry.
The simplification and rationalization of the Turkish system of trade
incentives is  in fact one of the main recommendations of the World Bank's
1982 Balassa mission, which has  concluded that the  system of protection in
Turkey has  traditionally discriminated against agriculture, with protection
rates lower than industry on the average  of 28%.  Similar conclusions have
been reached by the Yagci  (1984)  and Milanovic  (1986)  studies as well, where
the authors repeatedly  stressed the need for  the gradual narrowing and
eventual  elimination of the wide variations  in protection rates.  In
particular, Milanovic  (p.75) argued that the Turkish export encouragement
scheme for  the  1980-1984 period was not uniform towards  all  sectors, nor
towards  all producers;  and that, "it  consistently favored producers  of
capital goods over consumer and intermediate  goods industries and, in
28addition, gave  special  incentives to  large exporters."
Thus,  the ALMI  strategy introduces  a system of "neutral" protection
across  sectors in which the implicit anti-agriculture bias  is  eliminated.
In contrast to  a scheme of high export incentives, ALMI calls  for a
redirection of trade  incentives where domestic demand plays a leading role
under the auspices  of  an undistorted, open trade regime.  Also, as  another
reflection of adherence  to  the principle of openness in trade and, further,
to  assure comparability among the  two runs,  the nominal exchange rate is
adjusted each year so  as  to offset any differential between the domestic  and
the world inflation rates.
In short,  then, the  experiment results of the ALMI in comparison to  the
MXLI strategy indicate the rate  of return to  the national economy of a
"balanced" development  strategy that does not  discriminate between
agriculture and  the industry with respect to  its  foreign trade regime.
Turning back to  the macro side,  the model's  closure  rule requires  that
the  government  investment/GDP ratio be specified exogenously.  To assume
comparability among model-runs,  this  ratio has been fixed at the path
projected by the  Fifth Plan  (except for  the  third experiment, yet to be
described below).  The Plan projects  for a slow paced rise  in the  ratio of
public  investment to  the Gross Domestic  Product, which is  predicted to
stabilize around 11.6% by year  1990.  Assuming that  this particular ratio
reveals Turkish authorities'  desired rate of public investment  in the
medium-run, government's  investment fund is  kept at 11.6%  of the  nominal GDP
for  the entire  Sixth Plan period, as well.
Finally, as was also mentioned under the discussion of  the MXLI
experiment, the ALMI rate of growth of the  organized labor real wage  rate  is
assumed to  be 50%  higher than the one  envisaged for  the MXLI.  This
29assumption, in part, reflects the expected salient character of ALMI  towards
labor  as well as  its  democratic orientation.  However, these assumed
political attributes  should not be taken  as  the identifying  institutional
characteristics  of the above  distinguished experimental economic regimes.
Certainly, one  can count numerous other factors besides government's
sectoral priorities  in  investment and trade which may affect the  evolution
of the Turkish socio-political structure in  the next decade, a full
investigation of which  is  surely beyond the  scope of this paper.
What needs to be  stressed here  is  the wage-goods orientation of the
ALMI  strategy, which calls for building a strong domestic mass-consumption
market that puts primary emphasis on the  satisfaction of the domestic wants.
And, it  is  this particular nature of ALMI that  is  likely  to raise  the  factor
renumerations of workers,  in order  to generate the  foundations of the  strong
domestic  "mass-consumption  market."  The MXLI,  on the  other hand, seeks  its
source of demand in foreign markets,  and tends to  observe  the wage bill only
as  a "cost item", hence  the need for suppressing the  real wages.
We now turn to  the analysis of the  experiment results.  As  can be seen
from Table 4, on the basis of domestic macro performance, ALMI's  results
fare  substantially better than those of the MXLI's.  Both the  real GDP and
real consumption have consistently higher growth rates  under the ALMI
experiment.
Mainly as a result  of the faster economic growth,  real private savings
and capital accumulation is higher with the ALMI strategy, as well.  With
increased per capita incomes, private households  are  able  to  increase their
real  private savings at an average annual  rate of 5.6%,  as  compared to
MXLI's 4.0%.  Thereby the capital accumulation is  also more rapid under
ALMI, where aggregate  real  investment grows  at  9.1%  per  annum on the
30average.
With faster  capital accumulation, capital  is more abundant under ALMI.
This,  in part, explains the  lower average profit rate  figure of the ALMI
experiment  (21.7% versus 24.1%).  Another explanatory  factor is  embedded in
our very assumption that, with ALMI,  the organized labor real wage  rate
grows  50%  faster  as compared to  the MXLI's.  Further, observe  that  the
higher growth of the organized labor real wage  rate does not strain the ALMI
economy;  on the  contrary, more  labor is  able to  find employment  at the
higher organized labor wage  rate.  This suggests that in the ALMI  economy
labor productivity rises  faster, and, in effect, this  "permits" the
manufacturing real wages to  grow at a rate higher than the one observed in
the MXLI economy.
Table  4:  Experiment Results
Results  in Final Year  (1994)  MXLI  ALMI  ALMI-SEL
Real GDP  11412.5  12787.8  12530.2
Real Private Consumption  8041.4  8771.7  8574.4
Real Private  Savings  1038.5  1194.1  1148.2
Aggregate Real Investment  3010.1  3505.2  3243.6
Average  Profit Rate  (%)  4  24.1  21.7  21.6
Organized Labor Employment  5  3390.7  3688.4  3435.4
Agricultural terms  of trade  128.9  95.5  94.9
6
Merchandise Exports6   19.8  17.4  18.5
Merchandise 6  Imports  25.5  26.1  24.3
BOP Deficit  -0.4  3.0  -0.1
Growth Rates  to Final Year  (Annual  %)
Agriculture  3.7  6.2  6.2
Food Processing  3.9  5.6  5.6
Textiles,  Clothing  10.1  6.6  6.7
Intermediates  7.2  7.5  7.6
Machinery  8.2  8.9  8.5
31Table 4  - Continued
MLXI  ALMI  ALMI-SEL
Social Overhead  6.5  7.7  7.1
Services  5.5  5.5  5.3
Real GDP  4.9  6.2  6.0
Real Private Consumption  4.5  5.5  5.3
Aggregate Real Investment  7.3  9.1  8.2
Merchandise Exports  (Nominal)  11.5  10.0  10.7
Merchandise  Imports  (Nominal)  9.5  9.7  8.9
Growth Rates of Real Wages  (Annual %)
Rural Labor  3.4  2.9  2.8
Organized Labor  2.0  3.0  3.5
Unskilled Labor  -0.3  1.1  0.5
Service Labor  2.7  4.0  3.8
Index of Real  Absorption  in  1994  (1985=100)
Agriculture  142.5  171.3  169.9
Food Processing  143.8  163.3  160.0
Textiles, Clothing  209.6  180.7  176.0
Intermediates  177.9  185.2  181.8
Machinery  183.0  195.9  183.4
Social Overhead  176.8  195.3  186.1
Services  164.7  165.8  162.1
Index of Physical Capital  Stocks  in 1994  (1985=100)
Agriculture  162.8  210.6  211.0
Food Processing  264.4  206.2  200.3
Textiles, Clothing  335.8  233.8  215.3
Intermediates  149.6  163.2  168.8
Machinery  269.4  312.1  325.3
Social Overhead  146.5  141.8  142.9
Services  120.4  118.6  116.6
1)  Valued at market prices,  1981 Base
2)  Deflated  by  CPI,  1981  Base
3)  Deflated by the Capital  Price Index,  1981 Base
4)  1000 x Man years
5)  Ratio of the agricultural  to the non-agricultural sectors' producer
prices  (1985=100)
6)  Current billion US$.
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further illustrates  this  point.  In addition to  the slower  rate of growth of
the organized real wage  rate, both the unskilled and the service  labor
categories  experience lagging wage incomes under MXLI experiment.  In fact,
with MXLI,  the unskilled labor real wage rate  averages minus  0.3% per annum.
This  comes  on top of the  observed severe decline  in the manufacturing wages
during the  1980-1985 period.  Clearly, the MXLI  strategy continues to  impose
a very harsh pressure on urban real wages, and raises  doubts  so as  to
whether  it would be possible to  restrict the rate of growth of those wages
to  a very slow  --  or even to  a declining --  growth path throughout the whole
15-year period.  From a cultural and social  standpoint, it may be very hard
to keep  the workers' wage demands  in check for such a long period of time.
Especially, given its political and organizational experience during the
free  collective bargaining era of the past two decades,  it may prove to be
very difficult to  achieve further cutbacks  in  the share  of labor in total
manufacturing value  added.
On the rural side, however, the MXLI results  indicate that the rate of
growth of the agricultural real wage  is  more rapid than its  counterpart
under ALMI.  This  result,  of course, comes  as no  surprise especially when it
is  considered in relation to  the movements of the  agricultural terms of
trade across  the  two experiments.  Under the MXLI  experiment, the
agricultural terms of trade  index reaches  to  128.9  (with 1985=100),  whereas
with ALMI it  registers a slight  fall  (to 95.5).
This reveals  that, under ALMI, taking both price and  income effects
into account,  the  rate of increase in agricultural productivity is  faster
than the  rate of increase  in agricultural  prices.  In the  absence  of any
negating market restrictions,  the  relative abundance of the  agricultural
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of growth of farmers'  incomes.  This result  is  consistent with the findings
of the Adelman & Robinson  (1978) and de Melo  (1978) studies  as well.  Yet,
strictly speaking, occurrence of this phenomenon may run counter to  the
objectives of the ALMI strategy which puts primary emphasis  on the dynamic
rural-industrial  demand linkages.  This  point, in  fact, is  strongly  stressed
in Adelman (1984, p.945),  who argues  that  "the  appropriate dynamic
incentives  (which this policy aims  at fostering) will not materialize if
shifts  in domestic terms  of trade against agriculture  are allowed to negate
the  income benefits of productivity improvement",  and that "a continued
stream of technological improvements  can only be expected from farmers  if
they experience continuing  improvements in their  incomes".  What  is needed
--  along with the productivity-improving effects of the ALMI strategy --
then, is  a "terms  of trade policy" which will  guarantee that the  fruits of
the increased agricultural productivity will be equally shared by both
farmers  and the urban consumers.
The elements of this policy are plentiful and do not necessarily call
for the  government's  regulation of agricultural prices through price floors,
and what not.  Though, they certainly include  the elimination of the biased
trade policies which distort  incentives against agriculture and  impose
implicit taxes on agricultural exports.  The assymetric treatment of
agriculture, which is  often implicit in many developing nations'  trade
regimes, causes agriculture  to seem relatively  less profitable, with the  end
result that economic resources are  diverted away from that sector to heavy
industries, where domestic  resource costs are high, and dynamic  linkages
with the  rest of the economy are  limited.  International trade policy,
therefore, should constitute an important part of any policy package whose
34prime objective  is  to  improve  rural  incomes.  Adelman, in fact, recognizes
this point, and states  that  it  is  possible to  implement the  "terms  of trade
policy"...  indirectly through international  trade rather than through price
control  and subsidies  (by) following an open-economy policy of letting the
world market prices  set  the  internal terms  of trade".  The ALMI  strategy, by
imposing a uniform tariff rate  of merchandise  imports,  does not discriminate
against  any sector and allows both agriculture and  industry to exploit  their
full  economic potential.
As  a matter of fact,  the simulation results  indicate that, after  ten
years of the ALMI experience, the relative  lag in the  rural incomes,  as
compared to  the MXLI  alternative, is  indeed modest.  Also, compared with the
MXLI  results, one can see  that the difference  in the  rural incomes between
the  two  experiments  is  much smaller  than the observed difference in the
urban incomes.  One factor that  explains this outcome  is  the migration
possibilities recognized in the model.  Rural migration, as  attracted by the
differential in  the agricultural and the average urban wage rates,  releases
most of  the pressures on agricultural labor that are  imposed by the  falling
output prices.
Thus,  the  experiment results suggest that,  given the migratory
possibilities, negative terms of trade  effects of the ALMI  strategy are not
likely  to be severe, and can in principle be counterweighed by appropriate
social policies that are  designed to  improve  the material welfare of
farmers, such  as more  investment in human capital, improved education,
better health facilities, and the like.
A  case can also be made for dispersing  the  industrial activities more
evenly  (in the geographical sense) by making  the industrial capital more
mobile across  regions.  This policy option, in fact  is  strongly advocated by
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of the  industrial activities would result in  "...more  efficient factor
markets serving agriculture,  (which) in turn, would serve  for a reduction in
the disparity  in per capita incomes between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors"  (p. 57).  Such a policy would also  induce  "...a  more
optimal rate  of investment in human capital  (by increasing)  the rate  of
return on investment in agricultural  research and extension  (and by
allowing)...  the rural communities  to  capture the returns  to  such
investment"  (pp. 56-57).
Further,  in this context, Schuh argues that  a distinction has  to be
made between sectoral and regional migration;  and that "while the  sectoral
migration should be  encouraged and facilitated to  accommodate the  changing
conditions of supply and demand" (p. 62),  it has  to be recognized that
regional outmigration can impose  sizable negative externalities on the
supplying region by draining its most critical resources through a selective
process which "...can cause  the migration to be  either non-equilibrating, or
to  require an inordinate amount of time  for equilibrium to be  reached" (p.
60).  Thus,  in effect, policies designed to  induce capital  to  the  low-wage,
low-income areas would "...provide  a means of retaining the human capital
and skills in the  immediate area,  (thereby) internalizing the
externalities.  The outflow of conventional capital would also be retarded
or stopped, and the local  tax base would remain strong"  (p. 55).
Now, turning our attention to  the  international trade, we observe  that
the overall performance of ALMI  is not as  strong and convincing as  in the
previous macro  indicators.  The average rate  of growth of the nominal value
of merchandise exports cannot exceed the 10%  mark, and poorly contrasts with
MXLI's average  rate of 11.5%.  When the overall situation of the balance of
36payments  is  considered, it  can be seen that MXLI succeeds  in closing the
Sixth Plan period with a surplus  of US$  0.35 billion where ALMI  scores a
deficit  of US$  3.01 billion.  The BOP deficit, if valued in domestic
currency, comprises about 9.5%  of the  total savings generated  in  the ALMI
economy, and raises serious  doubts  about  the feasibility of the  favorable
results  achieved in other macro categories.  As  the model results  indicate,
the ALMI strategy seems  to  allow the Turkish economy  to reach her historical
growth rate of 6-7%,  with increased capital accumulation and higher private
incomes.  However,  in terms  of self-reliance and economic dependence, its
prospects are very gloomy,  as  the economy still  remains dependent on foreign
borrowing and on the exogenous  flows of workers' remittances.
The overall conclusion that emerges  from the model  results  is  thus
clear:  if Turkey attempts to  solve her Balance of Payments problems solely
through a foreign trade policy of heavy export subsidies, coupled with a
persistent emphasis  on manufacturing orientation that  does not take  into
account  the dynamic agriculture-industry interlinkages, nor  the needs of the
domestic markets, the end result will be  a slow-growing economy, with
suppressed wage-incomes and a hesitant domestic demand recovery.  On the
other hand, a primarily domestic demand oriented, wage-goods  strategy that
focuses exclusively on developing the domestic production network of
sectoral interlinkages,  seems to  achieve the  objectives of more  rapid
growth, higher per capita incomes,  and rationalization of the economic
structure;  yet fails to  create a self-reliant economy, that will not be
constrained by the availability of foreign funds.
The best strategy, therefore, is  a mixed one,  that entails  the positive
elements of both of the previous  two alternatives but attempts to  minimize
on their  adverse consequences.  More  specifically, what is  required  is  an
37economically viable alternative  that:  1) is  capable of generating
sufficiently high economic growth and of raising the  rate of  investment;  2)
gives  sufficient emphasis  to the needs  of the domestic demands  as well as
the domestic  savings;  3) recognizes  the need  for achieving a more  rational
production structure where intermediate and final  demand linkages across
sectors are taken into account and none of the  sectors  is discriminated;  and
finally, 4) is  capable of generating sufficient export revenues  so  that it
will not likely be hampered by the binding  foreign exchange  constraints.
In order to  test  the feasibility of such an alternative,  a third
experiment has been conducted which in effect attempts to blend the ALMI
strategy with a selective export promotion policy.  This experiment  is  to be
referred as  the  "Selective ALMI  Strategy",  or  "ALMI-SEL" in short;  and in
addition to the policies  of the simple ALMI strategy described above,  it
imposes  the  following:
1) For the Intermediates  and the Machinery sectors,  instead of
gradually eliminating the direct export subsidies by 1990, hold them at
their  1986  levels throughout the  FFYP period (1986-1989),  and then start
decreasing them gradually and abolish altogether by 1994.
2) Continue to  follow a constant PLD  real exchange rate policy
throughout  the FFYP;  however, for  the Sixth Plan period,  let  the parity
slide  down by devaluing the  PLD real  exchange rate by an average  of 5% per
annum.
3) To compensate  for the expected loss in foreign savings due  to the
attempts towards  eliminating the Balance of Payments deficit, increase the
government investment fund, bringing its  nominal value to  14% of  the GDP
throughout the whole experiment period.
4) In order to  finance government's  investment requirements and to
38allow non-inflationary  implementation of these policies,  increase household
income  tax rates  --  by 1% for  the  rural and worker households,  and by 1.5%
for  the capitalist households.
5) Increase the rate  of growth of the  organized labor's real wage  rate
to  an average  of 3.5%  over the whole experiment period  (1.5%  higher than  the
rate assumed for MXLI)  to  allow for  the  increased productivity of that  labor
category.
Thus, ALMI-SEL recognizes the  Intermediates and the Machinery sectors
as  the  "infant-export industries"  and provides additional  (yet quite modest)
export incentives through  the Fifth Plan period by holding their direct
export subsidy rates  at  their 1986  level  (10%),  during when for the other
other sectors,  the subsidies  are  in  the process of elimination.  As for  the
Sixth Plan period, the  granted export subsidies are  tied to  a time-table
which gradually diminishes  their rates  to nill by the end of the  experiment
period.  What is  implemented with this policy is,  therefore, a typical
"infant industries"  program which grants certain additional incentives  to
selected sectors  for a pre-determined period of time, at the  end of which
the  selective treatment will be eliminated.  The suggestion to  follow an
infant manufactured-exports program is,  in fact, not new and has been
advocated in the CGE modelling study by Dervis  & Robinson (1978),  and also
by Boratav  (1984a).  It  is hoped, with the  implementation of such a program,
that  the traditional  light-manufacturing and primary exports  orientation of
the Turkish economy will be  redirected towards more complex industries
which,  in the mean time, will be able  to utilize their potential economies of
scale and  "deepen" the  industrialization process.
The World Bank's  1982 Balassa mission to Turkey lends  support  to  this
argument as well,  in stating  that Turkey's  comparative advantage  is  to be
39found neither in  the simplest most labor-intensive goods,  nor  in the most
capital-intensive products.  Rather, "it  lies  in the  large  range of goods
between the  two extremes,  and increasingly skill-intensive products";  and
that,  "in the  longer term, Turkey's  comparative advantage will increasingly
lie  in electrical and non-electrical machinery, machine tools,  and
electronics"  (World Bank, 1982,  p. 22).
The third column in Table 4 presents  the main economic  indicators of
the ALMI-SEL experiment.  As can be observed, average rates of growth of
real GDP, real private consumption and real aggregate  investment are
slightly below the rates achieved under ALMI,  but still  substantially higher
than those  of the MXLI.  The slowdown of the engine  of economic growth
relative  to ALMI  is mainly due  to  the loss  of extra foreign resources
injected to  the domestic economy by way of deficits  in the balance of
payments.  Even so,  capital accumulation remains remarkably high thanks  to
the increased rate  of growth of real government  investment.
With respect to  foreign trade, we see  that ALMI-SEL's  results remain
favorable.  Nominal exports rise by an annual  average rate of  10.7%,  and,
though below the rate  achieved by the MXLI,  they suffice to  close  the
balance of payments deficit by reaching a modest surplus of US$  0.1 billion
in 1996.
Thus,  a comparison of the three model runs  suggests that,  on the basis
of the broad macroeconomic indicators  examined thus  far, ALMI-SEL presents
itself as  an economically viable and feasible alternative, achieving
considerable success both on the domestic and foreign macro  indicators.
A  further macro-level comparison of the three  experiments can be made
using  the results  from the  factor markets.  Such  a comparison indicates  that
the  real wage growth rates  of the ALMI-SEL economy follow a similar path as
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that under the ALMI-SEL experiment, the organized labor real wage rate is
assumed to grow at  an average  rate of 3.5%  per annum, which is  significantly
higher than the  assumptions  that were made  in the ALMI  (3%)  and the MXLI
(2%)  experiments.
As a matter of fact, under ALMI-SEL, the rate of growth of the  average
nominal manufacturing wage rate  reaches  21.8%  per annum -- the highest of
the  three experiments.  This  affirms  that the  internal logic  of the ALMI-SEL
rate of growth and export performance does not rely on suppressed wage
demands  that  restrain the  domestic demand on the  otherwise exportable
output,  as was  in the case of the MXLI  strategy.
This phenomenon should,  first and foremost, be attributed to  the
efficiency gains  of a more rational economic  structure that allows for  rapid
increases  in real wage rates by increasing the rate  of productivity growth
of all  sectors.  Higher productivity growth implies higher wage-incomes and
profits which, in turn, lead to  a higher level of consumption demand and
increased savings.  Thus,  growth breeds further growth, and the  economy is,
on a sustainable basis, able  to  reproduce itself for expanded production and
in the mean time  is  able to meet  the wage  demands of the workers.  For the
MXLI  economy, however,  the foreign demand on manufactured exports  alone
cannot generate the  same dynamism and settles  the growth path of the  economy
to  a  slower  paced  one.
As  a final  inference  from Table 4, we also observe  that the rate of
growth of the  industrial capital  stock is more rapid under ALMI-SEL,
indicating that the  linkage effects  are working.  Indeed, in the MXLI
experiment, Food Processing and Textiles are  the only manufacturing sectors
that achieve higher physical capital  stock indexes.  On the  other hand, in
41the heavy manufacturing industries of Intermediates and Machinery, capital
accumulation is  more rapid under ALMI and ALMI-SEL.
Generally speaking, the heavy export emphasis  of the MXLI strategy
seems  to be capitalized by the  "export-oriented",  light-manufacturers  such as
food, textiles,  clothing and leather, which, on the basis of their
traditional comparative advantage, expand rapidly, and, along with
Agriculture, exhaust  the  investable resources of the private savings pool.
ALMI-SEL on the other hand, achieves what MXLI fails  to  do with respect to
heaving manufacturing, by generating strong domestic  demand pulls for those
sectors, as well as by an energetic public investment program which
emphasizes accumulation of capital  in key linkage-industries.  On this
account, ALMI-SEL accomplishes  the best results, as with an  index of 168.8
in Intermediates,  and an index of 325.8  in Machinery, accumulation of real
physical capital is  the most rapid with this experiment.
The foregoing discussion of the model runs  suggests  that, coupling a
proper export-incentives program with a public investment strategy  that
seeks  a balance between the wage-goods  and the capital goods  industries  in
an overall consistent framework, where  the dynamic  interlinkages  of the
economy are taken into account, Turkey can attain her export targets without
causing undue strain on her  domestic markets.  The elements  of this
strategy also includes an  income distribution and a social welfare policy
geared towards the  improvement of the  rural people's material well-being in
order  to combat the pressures  of the likely negative terms of trade on their
incomes.
We have further seen that government's sectoral  investment decisions
play a key role throughout the whole process  in generating the  crucial
intermediate  input demand pulls for the  capital-investment producing
42sectors.  The next section brings  together the distinguishing elements  of
the  alternative strategy of growth and further attempts  to deduce some policy
conclusions  for  other middle-income developing countries,  as well.
5)  Discuss.ion
a)  Elements  of  the New  Strategy of  Growth
The foregoing analysis clearly indicated the  importance of the
vitalization of the domestic demand and also  the key role  that  could be
played by the domestic agriculture  in promoting the  industrialization
objectives of Turkey  in the  coming decade.  The forward runs  of the model
suggested that by combining a selective  export promotion program with a
domestic demand oriented, wage-goods  strategy which focuses primarily on the
development of the  domestic production network of sectoral  interlinkages,
Turkey can achieve a superior growth performance over  the current strategy
of manufactured export-led industrialization.
In general,  the  superiority of a rural-development led, wage-goods
oriented industrialization strategy seems  to  rest on the  following three
distinguishing advantages:  1) expansionary increases  in the national income
through technological change  in agriculture,  along with its consequent
multiplier effects on manufacturing growth through  the dynamic intersectoral
resource-pulls;  2) a change  in  the level and structure of domestic
production which can be manipulated to  satisfy a higher level  of domestic
absorption via increases  in wage-goods;  and 3) induced shifts  in the
relative demand for  factors  of production in favor of labor through
increases  in labor productivity.
Arguments based on agricultural pessimism in the Third World often
ignore those  dynamic mechanisms  that agricultural growth may invoke
throughout the  rest of the economy.  Yet, as  the model  runs clearly suggest,
43agriculture is  a potentially dynamic  sector, and can be used as  a leverage
to achieve  a wide array of development objectives.  We have  seen in section
four, for  instance,  that rapid agricultural  growth generates more efficient
growth patterns  in the production processes  of the consumer oriented
sectors, as  it releases  the contractionary pressures of their high cost
inputs.  This phenomenon can be very conducive  for designing macro policies
to  combat domestic  inflation.  Further,  it was observed that, with proper
incentives  and a proper investment policy, agriculture can display
sufficient flexibility to  absorb the burden of price adjustment, releasing
productive  resources  to be  employed within the  industry.
In sum, the model runs  emphasize the pressing need for a careful
reevaluation of the  current policies  towards agriculture, and suggest that a
conscious redirection of  the government's  incentives and  investment
priorities which is  so designed to  induce  structural changes  in the
functional role of that  sector --  from that of surplus extraction to  one of
surplus creation --  will be more effective in promoting Turkey's  overall
objectives of growth,  income equity and trade over  the Fifth and Sixth Plan
periods.
The  income distribution consequences of the new strategy will be
complex.  Generally speaking, based on the model  solutions with respect to
the  functional distribution of income,  the new strategy of growth is  likely
to  increase the  relative incomes  of the poor and of the  urban laboring
classes markedly.  This,  after all, will be the  logical outcome of a wage-
goods oriented strategy of development which is  based on the expansion of
the domestic market.  With respect  to  the  rural labor,  on the other hand,
the progressive distributionary effects  of the alternative  strategy will
depend on how fast the productivity increases  in agriculture  can be
44translated into higher material incomes through movements  in the  domestic
terms  of  trade.  However, the matter is  not only pricing issue.
Government's  social policies  towards human capital build-up  in rural areas,
by way of massive public investments  in health, education, transportation
and electrification, will  also be  equally important in  improving the
material welfares of the  rural poor.  This  second point is,  of course, a
part of the  social welfare objective, but  it is  equally part of the
industrial growth strategy,  in that  it would mean additional  effective
demand for  the products produced by the domestic  industry.
The technology adaptation aspects  of the proposed strategy are  likely
to have favorable effects  for  the rural poor as well.  As  Hayami & Ruttan
(1985) painstakingly point out, agricultural  "bio-technology", in contrast
to  "mechanical technology",  is  scale-neutral and divisible, thus making it
possible  for the  small/medium size farmers  to have  easy access  to  such
technology.  Further, there is  strong evidence  in the  economic literature
that  small/medium size  farmers use mostly labor  intensive methods of
production;  are very responsive to production incentives;  and  tend to  invest
heavily  in human capital formation.  1  In the Turkish rural socio-economic
structure,  in which small-peasantry  is  observed to be  the dominant mode  of
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production  , these hypotheses will be more  likely to  translate  into higher
adaptability and increased labor  employment in agriculture.
Overall then, the  following distinguishing elements  of the new strategy
could be  identified:
(i) First, priority should be given to  increasing agricultural
production and securing the  domestic network of sectoral linkages  through a
careful public investment program;
45(ii)  Based on the expected fact  that  the new investments will
necessitate  increases  in capital  imports, a realistic and comprehensive set
of commerical policies would have to be enacted.  A realistic foreign
exchange policy of currency depreciation along with a selective,  time-wise
regressive export promotion scheme can be  regarded as being the two most
important components of the new trade regime.  The proposed export promotion
scheme  is  selective and is  tied to a time  schedule, and is  thought to be
directed towards  the basic intermediates  and machine-tools industries,
through which Turkey would be  able to  develop and exploit her comparative
advantage, and in the meantime, would be  least likely to face protectionist
measures  in the  foreign markets.  In this  context, a further case can also
be made  in favor of an across-the-board scheme of tariff protection, along
with a discriminatory policy of domestic  taxation to  tap the  demand for
luxury imports,  and to provide additional resources for  the government
budget  in order  to  allow for  the anti-inflationary implementation of its
investment policies;
(iii)  In order  to counter  the likely negative effects of the falling
domestic  terms of prices against agriculture, a social welfare program of
rural development through expanded investments  in human capital should be
enacted;
(iv) Based on the  fact that agricultural development  --  by its nature of
small-scale production units and the overall irregularity of  the production
process  --  requires  a considerably decentralized administrative structure
(Mellor, 1976),  more participatory forms  of government and decision-making
should be encouraged.
In a nutshell, then, the proposed strategy entails elements  of an
industrialization program, an employment program, an income distribution
46program, and a social community-development program.  Further, due  to  its
underlying economic  and social  structures,  the new strategy of growth is
expected to  inherently allow  (or rather to warrant) more participatory forms
of government, a fact which would be very conducive in speeding up the
democratization process  of the  civil political life  in Turkey.
b) Policy Implications of the New Strategy for the Developing Countries
In this  section I  will  try to place  the elements of the new strategy
into  the theoretical perspective of the  international development literature
in an attempt to  infer some global policy implications  regarding  the
industrialization efforts  of the  other middle-income developing countries
during the  1990's.
Overall, a wage-goods oriented, agriculture-linked manufacturing growth
strategy appears to be most promising for  those developing  countries which
have a potentially large  domestic market and a proven responsive
agriculture,  along with an established physical infrastructure and
industrial base.  As Adelman  (1984, p. 948)  attests, practically this would
mean most  of the middle-income and the large  low-income countries, which
have not already reached the NICs'  status of proven export potential, or
those which are not anticipating a sufficient rapid growth in the world
demand for  their non-traditional exports.
In fact,  the observed stagnation of the volume of world trade  in  the
first half of the  1980's,  along with the rising tide of  the protectionist
sentiment  in the  developed market economies,  have already led a number of
scholars  to call for a reassessment of the  feasibility of export-led growth
as  the major development dynamic  for most LDCs  in the coming decade  (e.g.,
Kaplinsky, 1985;  Cline, 1982;  Sampson, 1980;  Streeten, 1982).
Based on his  observations on the  changing nature of the  global  economy,
47for  instance, Kaplinsky  (1985) argues  that the  international context of the
coming decade  is  not  likely to allow export-led strategies of development to
serve as  a viable alternative for the  less developed countries.  First, he
argues  that, mostly fueled by the enigma of the prolonged recession the
incidence of protectionism in the advanced countries  is more likely to
grow than to  decline, and given the limited/weak bargaining power of  the LDC
governments,  their exports are relatively worse affected (p. 78;  see also:
Verreydt & Waelbroeck, 1980;  and/or Sampson, 1980).  He further notes that
the degree of protection seems to  increase  proportionally with the extent of
value added involved, and "appear to be highest  in the  labor intensive
sectors where LDCs are being advised to specialize on the basis of
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comparative  advantage".  This fact seems  to hinge upon the observation
that  "the specific impact of these LDC  exports on individual firms,  plants,
workers and regions producing in developed countries  is  visible compared to
the generalized benefits arising from lower-priced consumer goods or
expanded LDC purchasing power"  (p.  78,  italics original).
A third observation propagated by Kaplinsky is  due  to  the radical
electronics-based technical change in the manufacture processes.  It is
argued that with the expanded development and diffusion of the micro-
electronics based technologies, the viability and the low wage-cost
advantage of the  LDC producers will likely to be undermined, since  such
technologies will  allow the automated machines  to  substitute for  the
14 unskilled labor in the production process.  This last observation is  also
important,  in that,  it  indicates a culminating process  that may evolve  into
a structural change  of the post-War pattern of trade  in which intra-industry
trade has grown more  rapidly than inter-industry trade.  Generally
speaking,  this phenomenon will  likely undermine the  logic of building "world
48factories"  and shipping parts around the world, and will place the  relative
burden of protection against LDC exporters  who are not yet part of the
"internationalized production network".16
Finally, it has been argued by Cline  (1982) that  there are  inherent
limits  to generalizing  the export successes  of the NICs  to other LDCs,  the
so-called "fallacy of composition".  In his careful simulation exercise, he
calculates  that if  all LDCs had the  same export-intensity as  the East Asian
Gang of Four  (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong),  adjusting  for
differences  in size  and level of industrialization, this would imply a
seven-fold increase in the manufactured exports of the Third World
countries.  "This expansion would imply a rise  in the LDC  share of the
market for manufactured imports  from 16.7 to  60 percent for  the  industrial
countries, and from 27.0  to 74.4 percent in  the United States.  (Further)
(...)  if  the product composition is  held the  same as  in the base period
(1976),  several  food sectors  show imports from LDC's  in excess  of the  entire
domestic market"  (p. 85).  Based on these observations,  Cline argues  that
protectionist response is  likely to  follow the  attempts to  generalize the
East Asian export-led model of growth.17
It has  to be noted in  this context  that, although this paper shares most
of  the elements of the  growing disenchantment in the economic  literature
towards  the viability of an export-led growth strategy for most LDC's  in the
next decade,  its main propositions  do not necessarily hinge upon any kind of
an empirically questionable  argument based on export pessimism.  Rather, as
stated in the  introductory pages,  the underlying motivation of this  study
has been based on  the observation that, as  there  are  inefficient strategies
of import-substitutionist growth, there can also be  inefficient styles of
the export-oriented development  strategy.  Surely,  the empirical debate on
49whether the Turkish economy, or the  developing countries in general, will be
able  to sustain rapid rates of export  growth in the  immediate future is  very
important in every aspect of the new development strategy, but the point is
that  its economic rationale  is  not conditional upon a negative attitude
towards  the  future export potentials  of the LDC's.
This brings us  to yet another parable  of this study, and it  is  the
basic  argument that  there is  no such eternal strategy that can be valid
for  all countries  at all  times.  In the Turkish context, for instance,  it
was  observed that  the early import-substitutionist  strategy was  quite
conducive  in giving an original  stimulus to  the Turkish industry during the
1960's.  However, this  initial momentum was quickly exploited by late
1970's,  and that strategy has  failed in  its  planned targets.  The  1980s'
strategy  of manufactured export-led growth, on the  other hand, has been
instrumental  in increasing merchandise  exports, and also changing their
composition in favor of  the manufacturing industries.  Yet  it could not
provide sufficient invigoration to the  domestic economy, and raised serious
concerns over the next decade  if/when the export potentials  of the export
promotion scheme has reached its  limits.  As we have seen in section four,
over  the medium-run, the model runs  clearly suggest the  superiority of a
domestic demand-based industrialization strategy which is  primarily oriented
towards  the production of wage-goods and towards  the simultaneous  expansion
of the intermediate  industries  and the overall absorption capacity of the
domestic economy.
The relevance and applicability of this conclusion to  the other middle-
income developing countries depend, of course, on the  specific structural
conditions of those indigenous  economies,  and also on the changing economic
18  In  the
and political conditions  of the global  international environment.  In the
50mean time, however, it  is  important to emphasize  that, potentially viable
alternatives  to export-led growth do exist,  and many developing countries
are  likely to benefit  from a careful reevaluation of their arsenal of
alternative policy options in  the  1990's.
51FOOTNOTES
1)  See Milanovic  (1986) and Yagci  (1984) for  a comprehensive evaluation of
the protection an the export-incentive schemes  in Turkish manufacturing
since 1980.
2)  Yagci, 1984, pp.  125-126.
3)  World Bank, 1982,  p. 49
4)  Ibid, p. 50.
5)  Calculated from the  SPO Annual Programs,  and from the Turkey data files
of the World Bank  (1986, Table  3.2).  In order to ensure  comparability
with the SPO's  sectoral aggregation scheme, exports of lightly
manufactured agricultural products,  such as processed tobacco, canned
fruits,  etc.  are included among the manufacturing industries.
6)  For example Berksoy  (1985, p. 145)  indicates  that the temporary
stagnation of exports in  1983 can mainly be explained by the  sudden drop
(by 4%)  of the  export demand of the Middle Eastern countries in that
year.
7)  Milanovic, 1986, p. 9-20.
8)  For example,  in 1984 the TL value  (using the average quarterly exchange
rate) of the  tax rebates  granted to manufacture  stood at 11.5%  of the
total consolidated budget revenues of the government.
9)  TUSIAD, (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association) Annual
Report,  1985, p. 16.
10)  TUSIAD, 1985, p. 40-43.
11)  See  e.g.,  the World Bank  (1982) World Development Report.  New York:
Oxford University Press.
12)  See, e.g. Keyder  (1983);  Boratav  (1983, Ch. 2) or Tutengil  (1983).  For
a recent review of the Turkish agriculture and its rural class  structure
from a political point of view, see  Seddon & Marguiles  (1984).
13)  Boratav (1984a) and (1984b)  shares this argument  for the  Turkish
exportables, as well.
14)  Kaplinsky  (1985, pp.  79-84).  For a more general  investigation of the
constraints faced by small-scale producers  in the developing countries,
see  Schmitz  (1982).
15)  For a good discussion of intra-industry trade  in  the context  of
developments in the world trade regime, see Ruggie  (1983).
5216)  Kaplinsky, ibid, p. 78  and 82.  See also  Frobel et.  al.  (1980) who
provide an extensive  research on the patterns  of international division
of labor, based on the mobility of international capital and the
increased use of low-cost  labor in  the designated sites  of the Third
World -- the  so-called "world factories  of production".
17)  In this  context, see  also  the critical discussion by G. Ranis  (1985)
"Can the  East-Asian Model of Development be Generalized:  Comment"
World Development 13(4),  April pp.  478-484;  and "Reply" by Cline (1985),
same  issue, pp. 547-548.
18)  For example,  for some political scientists,  the current  global recession
can be  attributed to  the disequilibrating pressures  of the  erosion of
the non-rival hegemony of  the United States  in  the world economy and
international politics, and to  the painful transitional phase  towards a
world system of many hegemonic states, none of which have  the ultimate
supreme power.  For the political implications of this view, see,  e.g.
R. O. Keohane  (1984) After Hegemony:  Cooperation and Discord in  the
World Political Economy, New Jersey:  Princeton University Press.
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57APPENDIX:  Equations of the Model
This appendix lists the equations  of the  CGE model.
Endogenous variables are denoted by capital  letters without any bar
(-)  on them.  All capital  letters with a bar,  lower case letters
and the  Greek characters are  exogenous variables or parameters.
Letters with a circumflex (^) are policy variables  to be  set
exogenously by the government.  Time subscript t is  omitted for all
variables unless  there are  time lags are involved.  The subscripts
i and j are used for sectors.  Unless otherwise noted, they range
from 1 to  7 (total number of sectors).  The subscript s refers to
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a.  =  1/(1+p  ) 1  1Endogenous Variables
PM.  Domestic price of the imported good
PE.  Domestic Price  of the exported good
PD  Domestic good price
PC.  Composite good price
PX±  Output price
PVA.  Value added price  (at factor cost)
PK. 1   Price of capital
1
XS.  Total supply
IN+.  Intermediate  input demand
W  Average nominal wage rate
L  Labor demand for  labor type-s, by sector-i
UHMP  Unemployed organized labor
RP.  Aggregate nominal profits
1
YHh  Household income  (h=R,W,K): R=Rural, W=Worker, K=Capitalist
YG  Government budget income
HHSAV  Household savings
GIF  Government investment fund (public savings)
DST.  Inventory stock investment
DKP  Real private  investment by sector of destination
DKG  Real public  investment by sector of destination
IDK  Real aggregate fixed investment by sector of origin i
1
CD.  Real private consumption demand
GDiOT  Aggregate nominal public consumption
GD.  Real public consumption demand by sectors
CC  Armingtonian composite good
i M.  Real imports
E.  Real exports
FSAV  Balance of payments  deficit
GDPMP  Gross domestic product at market prices
Dynamic  Stage Variables
LS  Labor supplies
MIa  Rural urban migration
EW  Expected (average) urban wage rate
L  Total urban labor  supply
u
7r.  Sectoral profit rate
Ir  Economy-wide average profit rate
HP.  Private investment sectoral allocation coefficients
1
K.  Aggregate physical capital
SR.  Sectoral share  in aggregate profits l
62Government Policy Variables  (All exogenous)
ER  Nominal exchange rate
tm.  Tariff rate
1
te.  Export  subsidy  rate
1
tn.  Indirect tax rate  (net of production subsidies)
1
th  Household income  tax rate  (h=R,W,K,)
S  Public  savings-GDP ratio
HE.  Public investment sectoral allocation coefficients
QG.  Sectoral allocation of public consumption
i
Exogenous Variables and Parameters
a..  Input-output coefficients
b  Capital composition coefficients
QNj  Price  index weights
1
P  Value of price index  (numeraire)
AD.  Production function shift parameter
1
a.  Production function share parameter
A.  Coefficient of proportionality of the  sectoral wage  rate
is
to  the average wage rate  for  labor type-s
WRRL  Organized labor real wage rate
r  Labor  supply  growth  rate
SM  Share of agricultural labor that joined the urban
labor  type-s
S  Migration mobility parameter
SREM  Share of remittances accruing to  rural household
SPBOR  Share of private foreign borrowing accruing to  rural
household
WR  Workers' remittances  (in foreign currency)
PBOR  Total foreign private borrowing
GBOR  Government's  foreign borrowing
PWM.  World price of imports
1
PWE.  World price  of exports
1
Sh   Household saving propensities
dk.  Ratio of inventory stocks  to gross  output
dp.  Depreciation rate of the physical capital stock
4  Financial market responsiveness parameter
63Q.  Sectoral  allocation of private consumption
B.  Shift parameter in composite commodity function
6.  Share parameter  in composite commodity  function i
a.  Elasticity of substitution in composite commodity function
1
AT.  Shift parameter in CET function
1
r1i  Elasticity of transformation in the  CET function
7i  Transformation function share parameter
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